Religion, morality and misdirection
Aug. 25th, 2008 03:35 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
sawylGreta Christina has an intriguing post in which she argues that religious faith is often treated as a synonym for morality. While I have a lot of sympathy for such an interesting idea, one that may well turn out to be true, I'm not sure that conclusion follows from arguments. Let me try to explain.
Greta takes as her example the case of a high school principal in Florida. When one of his pupils reported that she had been subject to homophobic bullying, her principal acted on his religious views, telling her homosexuality was wrong and that she was a danger to children, before outed her to her parents. Friends of the victim who objected to her treatment were then subject to a campaign of harassment. When the case was brought to trial, the judge censured the principal for his actions and the man was subsequently demoted, but when members of the local community were asked for their views, they generally endorsed the man's behaviour, claiming that he was a "fine man and good principal, and we are a gentle, peaceful, Christian, family-oriented community."
This she sees as damning. And it's not hard to see why, given the harm the principal's actions caused to the individuals concerned — individuals to whom he might be expected to owe a special duty of care, considering his role in loco parentis. And so, we should expect his actions to be condemned by the other members of his community. But does it follow from their failure to condemn that they have conflated the principal's religious faith with his moral rectitude? Only if we cannot find a plausible moral explanation for their actions.
Greta, as I've just done, condemns the principal's behaviour because the consequences of his actions inflicted significant harm on his pupils. But is it likely that the principal himself would see his actions in this light? I think not given that Christianity has a long association with deontological morality; a theory which emphasizes that the rightness of the original act is more important than the consequences that it brings. Thus, if a Christian believes that homosexuality is wrong and also that they have a duty to correct error wherever they find it, then they will believe morally justified in acting against any hint of homosexuality, whether it be in a high school or elsewhere.
This rather dubious argument gives us a reason for thinking that it may be possible for the principal and his supporters to believe that their actions are morally justified. But does this justification require religion in order to work? I don't think so. Both original premises stand free of religious justification — although it's true that the condemnation of homosexuality is often associated with religion, it's quite possible for an atheist to hold a similar view, albeit for different reasons — which indicates that it is not necessarily the case that religion and morality are being used as synonyms in the Florida case, although it may be contingently true.
In summary, then, my problem with the argument as given is that it assumes that the actions can either be justified on consequentialist grounds or the people involved are guilty of equating religious rectitude with moral rectitude. But I've tried to show that this is false dichotomy: the individuals involved might believe, for peculiar deontological reasons, their actions to be justified regardless of the religion allegiances of those involved.
Greta takes as her example the case of a high school principal in Florida. When one of his pupils reported that she had been subject to homophobic bullying, her principal acted on his religious views, telling her homosexuality was wrong and that she was a danger to children, before outed her to her parents. Friends of the victim who objected to her treatment were then subject to a campaign of harassment. When the case was brought to trial, the judge censured the principal for his actions and the man was subsequently demoted, but when members of the local community were asked for their views, they generally endorsed the man's behaviour, claiming that he was a "fine man and good principal, and we are a gentle, peaceful, Christian, family-oriented community."
This she sees as damning. And it's not hard to see why, given the harm the principal's actions caused to the individuals concerned — individuals to whom he might be expected to owe a special duty of care, considering his role in loco parentis. And so, we should expect his actions to be condemned by the other members of his community. But does it follow from their failure to condemn that they have conflated the principal's religious faith with his moral rectitude? Only if we cannot find a plausible moral explanation for their actions.
Greta, as I've just done, condemns the principal's behaviour because the consequences of his actions inflicted significant harm on his pupils. But is it likely that the principal himself would see his actions in this light? I think not given that Christianity has a long association with deontological morality; a theory which emphasizes that the rightness of the original act is more important than the consequences that it brings. Thus, if a Christian believes that homosexuality is wrong and also that they have a duty to correct error wherever they find it, then they will believe morally justified in acting against any hint of homosexuality, whether it be in a high school or elsewhere.
This rather dubious argument gives us a reason for thinking that it may be possible for the principal and his supporters to believe that their actions are morally justified. But does this justification require religion in order to work? I don't think so. Both original premises stand free of religious justification — although it's true that the condemnation of homosexuality is often associated with religion, it's quite possible for an atheist to hold a similar view, albeit for different reasons — which indicates that it is not necessarily the case that religion and morality are being used as synonyms in the Florida case, although it may be contingently true.
In summary, then, my problem with the argument as given is that it assumes that the actions can either be justified on consequentialist grounds or the people involved are guilty of equating religious rectitude with moral rectitude. But I've tried to show that this is false dichotomy: the individuals involved might believe, for peculiar deontological reasons, their actions to be justified regardless of the religion allegiances of those involved.
