Reith Lectures: Morality in Politics
Jun. 20th, 2009 11:14 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
sawylFollowing last week's lecture on markets and morals, this week Michael Sandel looked into the role played by morality in politics, via a brief excursion into Aristotle.
The main point of the lecture seemed to be to argue that the state is not founded on a neutral conception of the good based on a thin conception of the self, as Rawls does in A Theory of Justice, but that moral concepts are bound up in the way that we define certain elements of the state. This argument was illustrated with two striking examples, one drawn from the world of golf and one from the world of politics.
Using the example of Casey Martin, who successfully argued that his disability required that he be allowed to use a golf cart during tournaments, Sandel showed how many decisions turn on the Aristotelian distinction between the essential and accidental properties of a thing. Thus, Martin's case was shown to have ultimately turned on the question of whether walking round the course was an essential part of the game of golf or whether it was merely accidental to knocking a ball into a hole.
With the distinction between essential and accidental properties established, the lecure moved on to consider the essential nature of marriage, with particular reference to same-sex marriage, and whether our attitudes towards it embodied particular moral values. Rejecting the argument that same-sex marriage should be allowed on the grounds of fairness, Sandel noted that if this was indeed the justification, there could be no grounds for limiting marriages to two persons, because by doing so we would be treating polygamists unfairly. He also made it clear that there were no grounds for limiting marriage to heterosexual relationships on the grounds that marriage was for the purposes of procreation, noting that the parties to a marriage were not asked whether they intended to produce children and that people who were physically incapable of having children were allowed to marry. Thus, it was possible to rule out the production of children as an essential property of marriage. Instead he cited the Massachusetts court ruling in favour of same-sex marriages, which stated that the the point of marriage was to show public recognition and approval for a relationship. This, Sandel argued, clearly showed that the public conception of the good is not neutral, as Rawls would have us believe, but instead endorses particular virtues as being worthy of state endorsement.
Again, the lecture was interesting, thought provoking and well illustrated — the golfing example was particularly good, even Sandel did appear to corpse halfway through when he explained the professional golfer's concern that their sport was not treated seriously as an athletic achievement! My only real complaint, as before, was that the lecture was too short!
The main point of the lecture seemed to be to argue that the state is not founded on a neutral conception of the good based on a thin conception of the self, as Rawls does in A Theory of Justice, but that moral concepts are bound up in the way that we define certain elements of the state. This argument was illustrated with two striking examples, one drawn from the world of golf and one from the world of politics.
Using the example of Casey Martin, who successfully argued that his disability required that he be allowed to use a golf cart during tournaments, Sandel showed how many decisions turn on the Aristotelian distinction between the essential and accidental properties of a thing. Thus, Martin's case was shown to have ultimately turned on the question of whether walking round the course was an essential part of the game of golf or whether it was merely accidental to knocking a ball into a hole.
With the distinction between essential and accidental properties established, the lecure moved on to consider the essential nature of marriage, with particular reference to same-sex marriage, and whether our attitudes towards it embodied particular moral values. Rejecting the argument that same-sex marriage should be allowed on the grounds of fairness, Sandel noted that if this was indeed the justification, there could be no grounds for limiting marriages to two persons, because by doing so we would be treating polygamists unfairly. He also made it clear that there were no grounds for limiting marriage to heterosexual relationships on the grounds that marriage was for the purposes of procreation, noting that the parties to a marriage were not asked whether they intended to produce children and that people who were physically incapable of having children were allowed to marry. Thus, it was possible to rule out the production of children as an essential property of marriage. Instead he cited the Massachusetts court ruling in favour of same-sex marriages, which stated that the the point of marriage was to show public recognition and approval for a relationship. This, Sandel argued, clearly showed that the public conception of the good is not neutral, as Rawls would have us believe, but instead endorses particular virtues as being worthy of state endorsement.
Again, the lecture was interesting, thought provoking and well illustrated — the golfing example was particularly good, even Sandel did appear to corpse halfway through when he explained the professional golfer's concern that their sport was not treated seriously as an athletic achievement! My only real complaint, as before, was that the lecture was too short!
